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EU enlargement is supposed to entail profound impact on the location of economic activities 
in Europe. Although there is concern about the implications of enlargement for regional 
disparities in the EU, corresponding empirical results are still rare. The objective of this 
analysis is to provide empirical evidence on enlargement effects with a special focus on 
border regions in the EU27 since they are likely to play a critical role within the spatial 
dynamics initiated by integration. Departing from a three-region economic geography model 
we investigate whether changes in market access released by integration result in above-
average integration benefits in border regions. 
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EU enlargement is supposed to entail profound impact on the location of economic activities 
in Europe. Especially, the proceeding economic integration of Central and Eastern European 
countries (CEECs) might release diverse effects on EU regions, depending on their location 
and specialisation. Although there is some concern about the implications of enlargement for 
regional disparities in the EU, corresponding empirical evidence is still rare. The economic 
literature on enlargement effects focuses on EU-wide impact on growth and country effects.
1 
Bröcker and Jäger-Roschko (1996) and Bröcker (1998) provide quantitative estimates of 
regional effects in Europe caused by economic integration of the CEECs.
2 In recent studies, 
Brülhart et al. (2004) and Pfaffermayr et al. (2004) investigate the consequences of changes in 
market access due to enlargement for EU regions. Niebuhr (2004a) considers the impact of 
integration among Western European countries on EU15 border regions. Our analysis is 
closely related to the latter studies, however, we focus on the effects of enlargement on border 
regions in the EU27.  
 
Resmini (2003) notes that border regions are likely to play a critical role within the spatial 
dynamics initiated by the enlargement of the EU. With accession of the 10 new member states 
the share of border regions in total area of the EU increased from 22% in the EU15 to more 
than 35%. The corresponding percentage of EU population rose from 15% to almost 25%. 
According to the European Commission (2001), especially regions along the former external 
EU border may experience distinct integration effects because of their proximity to the new 
member states. In general, these internal border regions are expected to benefit from 
economic integration in the medium and long term since increasing cross-border interaction 
may initiate a dynamic growth process in these areas. However, in the short run the internal 
border regions might face pronounced adjustment pressures due to increased competition in 
product and on labour markets. Whereas regions with borders internal to the EU are not in 
principle regarded as disadvantaged by the Commission, external border regions, i.e. areas 
along external EU borders are assumed to be in more difficult situation. This applies in 
particular to the regions along the eastern borders of the new member states.  
 
This paper aims at providing empirical evidence on spatial effects of EU enlargement with a 
special focus on border regions in the EU27. The study deals with the issue whether 
enlargement via its impact on market access affects the spatial distribution of economic 
activity in the EU27. More precisely, we investigate the question whether internal border 
regions achieve above-average integration benefits due to their favourable access to foreign 
markets. Are there significant differences between regions in the EU15 and the new member 
states? Finally, are the external border regions in the new member states in danger of 
                                                 
1  E.g. Baldwin et al. (1997), Lejour et al. (2001) or Breuss (2001). 
2  The analysis by Aiginger and Pfaffermayr (2000) is relevant as well in this context since they 
investigate the concentration of economic activity in Europe in the 1990s when integration between 
Estern and Western European countries already started. 
  1permanently lagging behind due to an unfavourable geographic location with respect to the 
EU market? The effects of integration among EU15 and CEECs are investigated for the 
period between 1995 and 2000. The analysis is restricted integration effects arising from 
changes in market access release by declining impediments to cross-border trade. Thus we do 
not offer a comprehensive investigation of spatial integration effects because effects emerging 
from differences in specialisation and factor mobility are not considered. 
 
With accession of the new member states in May 2004 most formal barriers to cross-border 
interaction have been removed. But, on the one hand side, integration among EU15 and the 
CEECs already started long before accession in the early 1990s with the implementation of 
the Europe Agreements. On the other, there is evidence on significant border impediments 
even among highly integrated EU15 countries (see e.g. Bröcker 1998, Head and Mayer 2000, 
Nitsch 2000). The findings by Sousa and Disdier (2002) as well as Manchin and Pinna (2003) 
indicate that even higher impediments, caused by technical regulations, deficits in cross-
border infrastructure, institutional and administrative disparities as well as cultural and 
linguistic differences, might still exist between new and old member states. This analysis 
concentrates on effects resulting from a reduction of such border impediments. The objective 
of the paper is not solely to estimate the impact of tariff reductions between EU15 and 
CEECs. 
 
As theoretical fundament of the analysis we apply a new economic geography (NEG) model. 
NEG offers arguments why the market access might be a decisive factor with respect to 
spatial integration effects, in particular if the impact on border regions is concerned. A recent 
model by Brülhart et al. (2004) allows to derive specific implication for border regions. We 
estimate the relationship between market access and per capita income derived from the NEG 
framework. The regression results are applied in a simulation analysis. The basic idea of the 
simulation analysis is that a reduction of border impediments due to integration affects the 
accessibility of markets in the enlarged EU. Changes in the market potential of EU regions 
will in turn impact on regional per capita income.  
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 comprises a short description of the 
theoretical framework of the study. In section 3 empirical evidence on the size and 
development of border impediments in the enlarged EU is summarised. The underlying 
regression model and the simulation methodology are presented in section 4. Data and 
regional system are described in section 5. The results of the regression and simulation 
analyses are presented in section 6. Section 7 concludes. 
 
  22. Theoretical  framework 
 
An NEG model is applied to analyse the specific integration effects arising in border regions 
due to changes of regional market access.
3 Krugman (1993) and Krugman and Venables 
(1990) investigated the spatial implication of European integration within the framework of 
NEG models. According to corresponding approaches, changes in access to foreign markets 
emerging in the course of integration might act as a force that results in an uneven 
development of economic activities within integrating countries. However, most models do 
not provide clear-cut conclusions since integration might work to the advantage of central 
locations or peripheral areas. Moreover, only a few approaches allow to analyse explicitly the 
implication of integration for border regions because they consider an internal spatial 
structure of an integrating economy.  
 
A three-region NEG model by Brülhart et al. (2004) allows to address the issue of integration 
effects in border regions. In this approach, there are three regions in two countries, the 
domestic country and the foreign economy (0). The domestic country contains an interior 
region (1) and a region that shares a common border with the foreign country, i.e. the border 
region (2). The economies consist of a monopolistically competitive industry and a perfectly 
competitive agricultural sector. Goods are traded among all regions.  
 
Utility maximisation results in the following demand function for manufacturing goods
4: 
 















cij is demand in region j for manufacturing goods produced in region i. Pj is the price index for 
manufacturing goods in region j, pi is the mill price of varieties produced in i and Tij are 
transport costs. Manufactured goods are traded among regions incurring iceberg transport 
costs, i.e. a fraction of any good shipped melts away and only the part (1/Tij) arrives at its 
destination. The price of varieties produced in i and sold in j, (piTij), therefore consists of the 
mill price and transport costs.
5 The approach differentiates between cross-border transport 
costs (T01, T02) and internal transport costs (T12) which apply to interregional domestic trade. 
It is assumed that the border region has better access to the foreign market (T01 > T02). 
 
There are two factors of production: mobile human capital H and immobile labour L. In 
agriculture only labour is used as an input whereas the manufacturing sector uses both labour 
and human capital. There are increasing returns in the production of each individual variety of 
                                                 
3  See Niebuhr and Stiller (2004) for a more detailed presentation of corresponding models and their 
spatial implication as regards integration processes. 
4  We omit the variety subscript k because of the symmetry of all varieties produced in region i. 
5  In contrast, trade of the agricultural good is assumed to incur no trade costs. 
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labour and human capital enter as inputs. Fixed costs arise from the use of human capital 
whereas marginal costs are due to labour input. Because of increasing returns, each variety is 
only produced by one firm in one region. Thus regions do not produce the same set of 
products, but differentiated bundles of manufactured goods. The number of corresponding 
varieties is proportional to the region’s human capital. If human capital increases due to 
immigration, the number of supplied manufacturing goods will rise. There is no international 
factor mobility. However, human capital is mobile between the domestic regions. Human 
capital owners migrate towards the region that offers the highest utility. Migration takes place 
according to the following indirect utility differential: 
 
(2)  ) ( ) / ln( j i i j j i r r P P V V − + = − γ    0 , ≠ j i  
 
where ri is the compensation of human capital and Pj (Pi) is the price index for manufacturing 
goods in region j (i). Thus, there are two factors determining the mobility of human capital. 
Human capital owners migrate towards regions characterised by a relatively low price index 
for manufacturing goods and a comparatively high remuneration of human capital. 
 
Integration, i.e. a decline of cross-border transport costs gives rise to two opposed forces.
6 On 
the one hand, a rising accessibility of the foreign market increases the incentive to locate near 
foreign consumers for the domestic industry, i.e. to locate in the border region, because the 
importance of domestic demand declines relative to foreign demand. The strength of the 
centripetal force related to domestic purchasing power declines in the course of integration. 
Domestic agglomeration is also weakened due to the increasing weight of foreign supply for 
domestic consumers. Therefore the border region also gains attractiveness for mobile human 
capital owners since foreign supply of consumer goods becomes more important. On the other 
hand, integration will result in an increased competition from foreign firms, especially in 
border regions thus reducing the attractiveness of border regions as production sites.  
 
Thus, integration reduces both the strength of internal centripetal and centrifugal forces. 
According to the results of Brülhart et al. (2004), the effect on the centrifugal force 
dominates. Consequently, the probability that domestic manufacturing concentrates in one 
region increases due to declining external trade costs. If we assume perfect symmetry of 
domestic regions, the corresponding location of industry will be indeterminate. However, if 
the border region has better access to foreign demand, its attractiveness relative to the internal 
domestic region will rise in case of trade liberalisation. A concentration of manufacturing in 
the interior region is only possible in case a comparatively large number of manufacturing 
firms located in that region in the pre-integration period. From the perspective of the border 
                                                 
6  In the model, only the impact of trade liberalisation is considered. Effects resulting from free cross-
border movement of labour and human capital are ignored. 
  4region, the beneficial impact of an improved accessibility of foreign demand dominates the 
adverse effect of increased competition from neighbouring foreign firms.  
 
3.  Size and Development of Border Impediments in the enlarged EU 
 
Integration between EU15 and the CEECs started already in the early 1990 with the Europe 
Agreements which aimed at establishing free trade among the corresponding countries via the 
removal of tariffs and quantitative restrictions.
7 According to Bröcker (1998), tariff barriers 
on EU imports from the Visegrád countries
8 were already low by the mid of the1990s. 
However, non-tariff barriers due to different technical standards and regulations are 
presumably more relevant in this context and their reduction will be more time-consuming. 
Moreover, barriers caused by cultural or institutional differences persist. Therefore, 
impediments to trade between old and new member states are far from being abolished with 
accession of the new member states in 2004. Bröcker assumes that full membership implies 
an equivalent tariff reduction of around 10 percentage points. As regards EU exports to the 
Visegrád countries, impediments have been probably even larger and might range up to 25 
percentage points. 
 
Empirical evidence on differences in the intensity of border impediments among old and new 
member states is still rather scarce. Bröcker (1996) argues that trade impediments to non-EU 
trade are considerably higher than those among EU countries. He suggests a distance 
equivalent of 600 kilometers (tariff equivalent of 32%), implying that EU trade is 2.8 times 
higher than non-EU trade. This estimate takes into account that there are specific impediments 
to trade with transformation countries. In a recent study, Sousa and Disdier (2002) investigate 
the effect of legal framework on trade flows between some Eastern European countries and 
the EU15 between 1995 and 1998. Their estimates point significant border effects for 
Hungary, Romania and Slovenia. The results imply that these countries trade on average 31 
times more with themselves than with an EU or CEFTA country. Moreover, the border effect 
is stronger for trade with CEFTA countries than for EU countries.
9 A comparison of their 
results with estimates by Bröcker (1998) for EU15 countries suggests that by the mid of the 
1990s border effects between accession countries and EU15 countries are more important 
than among EU15 member, as one would expect.
10 This is confirmed by findings of Manchin 
and Pinna (2003) for the five accession countries Hungary, Poland, Romania, Latvia and 
Cyprus. Their analysis deals with the question whether market fragmentation is more relevant 
                                                 
7  The agreements also contain provisions for trade in services and the mobility of people and capital. 
8  Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. 
9  Members of the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) are Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, 
Czech Republic, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. Sousa and Disdier (2002) argue that the 
comparatively strong border effect with respect to CEFTA trade is due to the bilateral association 
agreements between CEECs and EU, which might result in a more rapid development of trade relations 
between CEFTA and EU15 countries compared with linkages within CEFTA. 
10  Bröcker (1998) estimates factors of around 20 by which international trade is reduced compared with 
intranational exchange of goods for well integrated EU countries. 
  5in the CEECs area than within the EU15. They detect border effects between 25 and 220 
depending on the approach adopted by the EU to remove technical barriers to trade. 
 
Corresponding differences with respect to the intensity of integration are also reflected by the 
so called integration factors applied in the study by Fürst et al. (1999) which are designed to 
reflect economic and political relationships between countries and expressed as a time penalty 
on travel time. The authors also estimate the development of the integration factors for 
different country groups. Decreasing time penalties between the EU and CEECs reflect the 
integration process. The study assumes that time penalties halve between the mid of the 1990s 
and the accession date from 120 minutes to 60 minutes. 
 
Brülhart et al. (2004) analyse integration effects in EU15 regions that arise from enlargement, 
via simulating changes in market access caused by declining border impediments. However, 
they model enlargement in a fairly simple way. In the analysis, a pre enlargement situation, 
where only purchasing power of the old member states enters into market access, is compared 
with the integration case where also income of the CEEC countries is relevant for the market 
potential. In contrast, we use the above information on the intensity and evolution of border 
impediments in the enlarged EU to investigate the integration process between the CEECs and 
the EU15 countries in order to evade this all-or-none modelling of integration. We presume 
that trade impediments between EU15 countries and the new member states amount to a 
travel time equivalent of 450 minutes as compared to intra-EU15 trade. Following Bröcker 
(1998), we also investigate an asymmetric reduction of trade impediments among new and old 
member states. Accession is associated with an equivalent tariff reduction of 10 percentage 
points with respect to EU imports from CEECs. As regards EU exports to the CEECs, a 
decline of 25 percentage points is assumed. This corresponds with a decline of time penalties 
of roughly 100 and 230 minutes respectively in our analysis. Moreover, using the information 
given in Fürst et al. (1999), the effect of an uniform reduction of border impediments by 60 
minutes between EU15 and CEECs is investigated. Finally, the case of an asymmetric 
integration between EU15 countries and CEECs is considered. We analyse both a stronger 
reduction of border impediments between EU15 and CEECs as compared to integration 
among CEECs (minus 100 minutes versus 60 minutes) and a more intense integration among 
CEECs relative to integration with the old member states (minus 100 minutes versus 60 
minutes).  
 
4.  Regression and Simulation Framework 
 
In order to simulate regional integration effects caused by a reduction of border impediments 
among EU15 and CEECs, we first need to determine the relationship between indicators of 
  6economic activity and market access on the regional level. We use the so-called nominal wage 
equation, one of the main propositions emerging from NEG models, to determine this link
11: 
 



















i j P e Y w
ij
 
with wj as the nominal wage in region j, Yi as income in region i. τ is transport costs per 
distance unit and dij is the distance (travel time) between the regions i and j. Equation (3) 
states that the regional wage level is affected by the weighted sum of purchasing power in all 
accessible regions. The weights of purchasing power decline with increasing distance between 
locations i and j. Labour demand and wages are relatively high in locations close to high 
consumer demand (see Hanson 2000). Regional wages increase with income of neighbouring 
regions and decline with rising transport costs to these locations.  
 
With respect to the estimation of equation (3), we have to take into account that regional data 
sufficient to generate robust regression results is not available for a cross section that covers 
all EU27 regions.
12 Therefore, the determination of the relation between regional per capita 
income and market access rests on a cross section of EU15 regions. Moreover, we have to 
assume that the price index is equal in all regions (Pi = P) to arrive at an estimable equation, 
since there is no consistent information on regional price levels in the EU. This implies that 
nominal instead of real market access is considered. Nominal market access is frequently used 
in empirical studies that investigate implications of NEG. We use GDP per capita as 
dependent variable zj, thus considering that market access is a main influencing factor of the 
spatial structures of per capita income. The regression model is given by: 
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A model including only market access as explanatory variable can only represent a limited 
explanation of regional disparities. Local amenities or the sectoral composition of the regional 
economy are most likely additional factors that impact the spatial distribution of economic 
activities. To allow for such effects and check the robustness of the estimated relationships 
between region’s market access and per capita income, the regression model also includes 
some control variables Xin. Applied control variables comprise indicators for sectoral 
composition of regional economies, the presence of local amenities, as well as dummies for 
countries and outlying regions if necessary (see appendix for details).  
                                                 
11  See Hanson (2000), Brakman et al. (2002), Mion (2003) and Niebuhr (2004b) for empirical evidence on 
the nominal wage equation. 
12  The problem of insufficient data availability for regions in the new member states pertains in particular 
to the availability of control variables necessary to ensure a robust estimation of the correlation between 
market access and regional per capita income. 
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3.1  Simulation Analysis 
 
The coefficient of market access  1 α  and the distance decay parameter  2 α , fixed by means of 
regression analyses, are used to generate market potentials and to investigate the effects 
changes in market access on regional per capita income. The analysis deals with the spatial 
impact of integration among EU15 and CEECs released by declining border impediments 
which change market access of European regions. The period under consideration is limited to 
the phase after the mid of the 1990s due to data restrictions. Integration is modelled via a 
manipulation of the travel time matrix applied in the calculation of market potentials. 
Interregional travel time data by Schürmann/Talaat (2000), used in the regressions and the 
simulation analyses, comprise specific border impediments. Cross-border travel time includes 
waiting times at border crossings. We base the perfect integration scenario on this travel time 
matrix, thus apart from waiting times all other border impediments are set to zero in this case. 
Furthermore, to simulate economic integration of the CEECs since the mid 1990s we add 
travel time equivalents of border impediments to the raw travel times which diminish until 
accession according to assumptions based on the information of studies surveyed in section 3.  
 
The market potential of region j in year t is given by: 
 
(5)    ∑
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where Yit is income in region i in year t,  2 α is the distance decay parameter determined in the 
regression analysis and dij is the distance between the regions i and j. bijt are travel time 
equivalents of border impediments in year t. In this analysis, only the effects of declining 
border impediments between EU15 countries and CEECs and among new member states are 
considered. Thus: 
 
•  bijt = 0,    if i and j are located in the same country 
•  bijt = 0,    if i and j are located both in the EU15 
•  bijt > 0,    if i and j are located in two different new EU member states 
•  bijt > 0,    if i and j belong to an old and a new member state.  
 
Based on the information on the intensity and development of border impediments between 
EU15 and CEECs, we consider the following scenarios: 
 
1. Uniform reduction of border impediments by a travel time equivalent of 60 minutes 
2. Asymmetric reduction of border impediments by travel equivalents of 100 and 230 minutes 
a) Reduction by 100 minutes with respect to EU15 imports from CEECs and 230 minutes 
as regards EU exports to CEECs 
b) Reduction by 230 minutes with respect to EU15 imports from CEECs and 100 minutes 
as regards EU exports to CEECs 
  83. Asymmetric reduction of border impediments between EU15 and CEECs as compared to 
integration among CEECs 
a) More intense integration between EU15 and CEECs as compared to integration among 
CEECs: reduction by 100 minutes between EU15 and CEECs and by 60 minutes among 
CEECs 
b) Less intense integration between EU15 and CEECs as compared to integration among 
CEECs: reduction by 60 minutes between EU15 and CEECs and by 100 minutes among 
CEECs 
 











































log log                  





The overall change   caused by the change in market access can be partitioned 
into the effect of reduced border impediments and the effect resulting from the development 
of regional income. In order to isolate the effect of declining border impediments, the change 
in z is determined for given regional income as well:  
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Thus we consider changes in market access caused by regional income growth in EU27 
regions between 1995 and 2000 and the effect on market access that is solely due to the 
decline of border impediments. Results are compared for EU15 countries and new member 
states as well as for different types of regions: internal and external border regions as well as 
non-border regions in order to investigate whether border regions achieve above or below 
average integration benefits. Internal border regions are defined as regions that share a 
common border with a foreign EU region. External border regions are those EU regions along 
the external EU border. Changes in regional market access and per capita income are 
estimated for the period 1995-2000.  
 




Dependent variable in the regression analysis is log per capita GDP. The regression model is 
estimated with data for 1995 and 2000. The dependent variable is given for 158 European 
regions. In the regression analysis, regional income, i.e. purchasing power, is approximated 
by GDP in 205 European regions. Indicators for the sectoral composition of regional 
economies are based on GVA data by NACE-CLIO R6 classification (agricultural, forestry 
and fishery products, manufactured products, building and construction, market services, non-
market services). The corresponding GVA shares, i.e. the percentages of regional GVA in 
agriculture, manufacturing et cetera, are used as control variables. The data were taken from 
Cambridge Econometrics’ European regional databank and the Regio databank of Eurostat. 
Information on local amenities (e.g. length of the seashore, mean annual sunshine radiation, 
concentration of cultural sites), used as additional controls were taken from the databank 
generated in the course of the Study Programme on European Spatial Planning (SPESP).
13 
The simulation analysis, i.e. the calculation of different market potentials is based on GDP 
data for the period 1995 to 2000. Data for the calculation of market potentials are available for 
a cross section of 943 EU27 regions. 
 
5.2  Distance Measurement and Border Impediments 
 
Interregional distance between EU27 regions is measured by travel time in minutes between 
the centres of the regions. A specific problem refers to internal distances that enter into the 
market potential formula. Internal distance is modelled as proportional to the square root of 
the region’s area.
14 We determine the internal distance of region i in minutes of travel time as: 
 
(8)  i ii A d ⋅ = 75 . 0,  
 
where Ai denotes the area of region i in km
2.  
 
Our analysis deals with the effects of EU enlargement on regional market access and per 
capita income in the EU27. Therefore, we ignore the proceeding integration process among 
the EU15 countries although this has definitely an ongoing impact the spatial structure of 
economic activity in Europe as well. The focus of the investigation implies that the size and 
development of border impediments between EU15 countries and former candidate countries 
matter as well as border effects among CEECs. As quantitative information on border effects 
between these countries is scarce (see section 3), we cannot adopt bilateral border 
                                                 
13  See Bundesamt für Bauwesen und Raumordnung (Eds.): Study Programme on European Spatial 
Planning. Final Report. Forschungen 103.2.- Bonn 2001. 
14  This methodology is frequently applied in the corresponding literature. See e.g. Head and Mayer 
(2000). 
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corresponding information given in Bröcker (1998) and Fürst et al. (1999). Accordingly, we 
assume that integration results in an reduction of border impediments between the mid of the 
1990s and 2000, given as a time penalty in minutes, between 60 and 230 minutes (see section 
3 for details).  
 
5.3 Regional  systems 
 
Within the framework of the analysis, three cross sections have to be distinguished. For the 
regression analysis two of them are relevant: One cross section concerns the dependent 
variable and comprises 158 EU15 regions. The second cross section consists of all regions the 
income of which is included in the market potential of the regression analysis, in total 205 
European regions. These cross sections largely correspond with the NUTS 2 level in the 
EU15. Exceptions concern in particular Denmark (3 former NUTS regions), Belgium, 
Germany (NUTS 1 level) and Sweden (NUTS 3 level). East German regions, Départements 
d’outre-Mer (France), Açores, Madeira (Portugal), Ceuta y Melilla, Canarias (Spain) are not 
considered because of data restrictions. Norway (19 Fylke) and Switzerland (7 
Grossregionen) are included in the larger cross section for estimation of the market potential. 
With respect to the left hand side of the regression model, Sweden, Norway and Switzerland 
could not be considered because of data restrictions. We cannot determine the relationship 
between market access and per capita income for an EU27 cross section because restricted 
data availability with respect to Eastern European regions does not allow to generate robust 
results. 
 
In contrast, the simulation analysis refers to EU27 regions. The calculation of corresponding 
market potentials considers income in EU27 regions plus regions in Norway and Switzerland. 
Market access is defined with respect to the enlarged European market. We are primarily 
interested in changes in market access due to a decline of border impediments between EU15 
and CEECs, not in the absolute level of market potential. The third cross section relevant for 
the simulation analysis consists of 943 EU27 regions, mainly on NUTS 3 level. We choose 
NUTS 3 level, i.e. fairly small observational units, for the calculation of market potentials and 
the estimation of integration effects to ensure an adequate definition of border regions. The 
sample contains NUTS 3 regions, some NUTS 2 regions as well as functional regions 
consisting of several NUTS 3 units.
15  
 
                                                 
15  A more detailed description of this cross section is given in the appendix. 
 
  116. Empirical  Results 
 
6.1 Regression  Results 
 
The results of the regression analysis based on equation (4) for per capita income are 
summarised in Table 1. Only estimates of the coefficients relevant for the simulation analysis 
and the years 1995 and 2000 are presented. In all regression models control variables and 
dummies for outlying regions are included.
16 The coefficients  1 α  and  2 α  are highly 
significant with expected signs. The results suggest that market access has a positive effect on 
per capita income of European regions. The coefficient  2 α  can be interpreted as a spatial 
discount factor that determines the changes in the weight of purchasing power with increasing 
travel time between regions. The estimates imply that the intensity of demand linkages 
declines by 50% over a range of roughly 180 minutes of travel time. We apply averages of the 
coefficients  1 α  and  2 α  given in Table 1 in the simulation analysis of per capita income. 
 
[Table 1 around here] 
 
We also apply nonlinear instrumental variables estimation to address a possible endogeneity 
problem, i.e. right hand side variables, such as regional income are not exogenous, potentially 
causing inconsistent estimates. Historical data on regional GVA and population, lagged by 10 
years, are used as instruments for contemporary income. Unreported results of nonlinear 
instrumental variables regressions will closely resemble the NLS results summarised in Table 
1, if we choose starting values close to the NLS coefficients. We also test for spatial error 
autocorrelation and estimate spatial econometric models in case of a misspecification as 
indicated spatially autocorrelated residuals.
17 Results of Moran’s I test on spatial 
autocorrelation in Table 1 indicate that the regression models are misspecified due to ignored 
spatial effects. In order to check the consequences with respect to the coefficient of market 
access, spatial error and spatial lag models are estimated. We only refer to the estimates of the 
spatial error models because they achieve a better fit than the spatial lag models. In the spatial 
approach, the coefficient of market access ranges between 0.15 and 0.18. Differences between 
spatial estimates and coefficients of the NLS regression are thus fairly small. Altogether this 
suggests that taking into account the spatial autocorrelation does not change the implications 
regarding the relevance of the market potential with respect to per capita income.
18
 
6.2  Spatial Effects of Enlargement 
 
Figure 1 shows the simulation results for different groups of regions based on scenario 1. 
According to the simulation results, regions in the CEECs tend to obtain higher increases in 
                                                 
16  Outlying regions are defined as those observations the standardised residuals of which exceed the value 
⎢2.5⎢. Results for the included control variables are available from the author upon request.  
17  A binary contiguity matrix was applied as spatial weights matrix. 
18  Unreported regression results are available from the author upon request. 
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to border regions in the new member states only. Internal as well as external border regions in 
CEECs achieve a relatively pronounced raise in their market potential since the impact of 
declining border impediments is above average. The effects of integration account for a much 
larger share of the overall change in market access in these regions compared to border 
regions in the EU15. Growth of market potential conditional on economic integration is 
higher in internal border regions (7.9%) than in non-border areas of the CEECs (4.4%). This 
is in line with the implications of the theoretical model. But the strong increase in market 
potential of external border regions (8%) conflicts with the prediction of the model because 
we would expect areas along the external border of the EU27 to have rather poor access to 
purchasing power of the enlarged EU. At least in parts the favourable findings for the external 
border regions are caused by the low base level of market potential. The main features of the 
region type specific results in scenario 1 apply to the simulation evidence of all scenarios.  
 
[Figure 1 around here] 
 
The spatial structure of integration effects is most notably characterised by an East-West-
gradient (Figure 2). This corresponds with evidence provided by Pfaffermayr et al. (2004). 
The regions that achieve the highest growth of market potential are those located in the 
CEECs directly adjoining to the EU15 market. Some areas along the Eastern borders of 
Poland and Romania significantly lag behind as regards integration benefits in the new 
member states. The pattern might also explain the rather favourable results for the external 
border regions in the old member states. Corresponding regions are mainly located in Finland 
and Greece. As a result of their location in the eastern part of the enlarged EU these regions 
realise comparatively high growth of market access due to enlargement. In contrast, for 
regions in the western periphery of the EU enlargement is virtually of no relevance for their 
market potential. 
 
[Figure 2 around here] 
 
Table 2 summarises the effects of integration on per capita income, focusing on the CEECs. 
As already indicated by the previous results, there is no significant impact on income in EU15 
countries. On average, the relative change of GDP per capita is well below 1% in the EU15 in 
all scenarios. Largest effects in the EU15 emerge in some Austrian regions with increases up 
to almost 2%. Referring to the impact on CEECs, relative income changes on the country 
level range from 0.4% for Romania to 13.2% for Slovenia in scenario 2b, the assumptions 
giving rise to the strongest impact on CEECs among all scenarios. Countries in the periphery 
such as Romania, Bulgaria and Lithuania achieve only a modest growth of market access and 
per capita income, whereas member states located closer to the centre of the EU27-market, 
e.g. Slovenia and the Czech Republic realise above average benefits. Moreover, the size of the 
countries seems to correlate with integration induced change in GDP per capita. For small 
countries proximate to the centre of the western European market (e.g. Slovenia, Czech 
  13Republic) we estimate higher income growth than for relatively large new member states such 
as Poland that also shares a common border with the EU15. This might reflect that small 
countries due to an above average significance of border regions are marked by a relatively 
strong outward orientation and more favourable access to foreign markets. There is also 
considerable variation with respect to the performance of different region types across the 
CEECs. In Poland the pattern is in accordance with the implication of our NEG model with 
the internal border regions obtaining highest income effects and the external border regions 
lagging behind. In contrast, external border regions in Bulgaria and Estonia obtain most 
pronounced income changes due to reduced border impediments in some scenarios. These 
country specific patterns as regards the region type effects could be caused by differences 
concerning the location with respect to the EU27 market. In other words, depending on the 
position of a country relative to the centre of the EU market external border regions might 
achieve above or below average integration benefits. 
 
[Table 2 around here] 
 
Figure 3 summarises the market potential effects of different integration scenarios on new and 
old member states. It is evident that the assumptions regarding the decline of border 
impediments have significant impact on the overall effect. However, the EU15 realises only 
small benefits in all scenarios whereas the change of market access in the new member states 
is significantly affected by the assumption concerning magnitude and symmetry of reduction 
of border impediments. The new member states gain most in scenario 2b since we assume a 
pronounced reduction of border impediments by 230 minutes travel time equivalents with 
respect to EU15 imports from the CEECs in this case, whereas for EU15 exports to the new 
member states impediments decline by 100 minutes only. In scenario 2a, turning around the 
assumption of an asymmetric reduction with respect to EU15 and CEECs, the EU15 countries 
realise highest increase in market access. However, the impact remains negligible with 0,4%. 
In the scenarios 3a and 3b, we consider asymmetric reduction of border impediments among 
EU15/CEECs on the one hand and between CEECs on the other hand. The differences 
between both cases point to the importance of the EU15 market for the new member states. 
The change in market potential of the CEECs will be higher, if we assume more pronounced 
decline of border impediments between EU15 and CEECs. Assuming more intense 
integration among the new member states as compared to integration with the EU15, results in 
a smaller increase of market access of the CEECs. Therefore reduction of border impediments 
among old and new member states is more important for the CEECs than integration among 
each other. 
 
[Figure 3 around here] 
 
Finally, we compare our results with corresponding evidence provided in two recent studies 
of the impact of enlargement on regional market access in Europe. Brülhart et al. (2004) 
analyse the effects of enlargement on EU15 regions applying a similar methodology. Ranging 
  14from 0,48% to 2,77% the income effects in EU15 regions in their study considerably exceed 
our estimates. The differences can at least partly be traced back to the modelling of 
enlargement in the simulation analysis. The assumptions by Brülhart et al. (2004) are extreme 
since before enlargement the CEECs and their purchasing power are non-existent whereas 
after integration income of the new member states impacts on the EU15 without any border 
impediments remaining. Therefore the findings should be understood as an upper limit of 
corresponding integration effects. Pfaffermayr et al. (2004) investigate the impact of 
enlargement on both EU15 regions and some new member states. Concerning the results for 
the EU15, their results point to changes in per capita income up to 0,61%, which are more in 
line with our evidence. However, with growth rates up to almost 63% the effects in the new 
member states are much more pronounced in their study than in our analysis. As Pfaffermayr 
et al. (2004) also assume a more gradual decline of border impediments with some hindrances 
remaining after enlargement, differences between the estimates are likely to be caused by 





Our findings suggest that there are pronounced differences among regions in the enlarged EU 
as regards the integration effects resulting from changes in market access. The simulation 
analysis indicates that the new member states benefit more from enlargement than EU15 
countries. Thus, the impact of enlargement will be in support of cohesion, if we consider 
effects on market potential and corresponding income changes only. Moreover, some results 
are in line with the implications of our theoretical model since border regions indeed realise 
higher integration benefits than non-border regions. However, relatively high income changes 
in regions along the external EU borders are in contrast to the theoretical framework. The 
NEG model should predict below average income effects due to declining border 
impediments in external border regions because of their peripheral location. The surprisingly 
strong impact of enlargement on market potential of external border regions might be partly 
caused by the extremely low level of market potential before integration. Moreover, a location 
at the external EU border might not always coincide with the most unfavourable access to the 
centre of the European market. 
 
Results for the different scenarios point to the importance of our assumptions regarding the 
reduction of border impediments. Corresponding evidence suggests that the EU15 market is 
more important for the new member states than purchasing power in the CEECs. The change 
in market potential of the CEECs will be higher, if we assume more pronounced decline of 
border impediments between EU15 and CEECs than among CEECs. Integration among old 
and new member states is more important for benefits of the CEECs and therefore cohesion in 
                                                 
19  Pfaffermayr et al. (2004) estimate a linearised regression model and therefore have to make assumptions 
regarding the distance decay parameter. In contrast, we estimate the impact of distance on the intensity 
of demand effects. 
  15the enlarged EU than integration among the new member states. However, altogether the 
income effects of enlargement due to increasing market access remain small, irrespective of 
scenario assumptions. Only some CEEC regions along the former external EU15 border 
achieve significant effects on GDP per capita. Of course, the absolute magnitude of effects 
has to be interpreted with much caution. We investigate only one specific impact of European 
integration. Other integration effects might be more important and work in an opposite 
direction as regards differences between border and non-border regions as well as EU15 
countries and CEECs. 
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  18Appendix 
 
A1. Cross  sections 
Three cross sections are applied in the analysis. For the regression analysis two of them are 
relevant: One cross section concerns the dependent variable and comprises 158 EU15 regions. 
The second cross section consists of all regions the income of which is included in the market 
potential, in total 205 European regions. With respect to the simulation analysis a third cross 
section is relevant that covers the entire EU27. For the simulation of integration effects we 
mainly refer to the NUTS 3 level. 
 
EU27 – 943 regions (NUTS 2, NUTS 3, planning regions) 
Austria:    35 NUTS 3 regions 
Belgium:    43 NUTS 3 regions 
Bulgaria:    28 NUTS 3 regions 
Czech Republic:  14 NUTS 3 regions 
Germany:    97 planning regions (functional regions comprising several NUTS 3 regions) 
Denmark:    15 NUTS 3 regions 
Estonia:    5 NUTS 3 regions 
Spain:      48 NUTS 3 regions (excluding Ceuta y Melilla, Canarias) 
Finland:    20 NUTS 3 regions 
Frankreich:    96 NUTS 3 regions (excluding Départements d’outre-mer) 
Greece:     51 NUTS 3 regions 
Hungary:    20 NUTS 3 regions 
Ireland:     8 NUTS 3 regions 
Italy:    103  NUTS  3  regions 
Lithuania:    10 NUTS 3 regions 
Luxembourg:   1  region 
Latvia:     5 NUTS 3 regions 
Netherlands:    40 NUTS 3 regions 
Poland:     16 NUTS 2 regions 
Portugal:    28 NUTS 3 regions (excluding Açores, Madeira) 
Romania:    40 NUTS 3 regions, 1 NUTS 2 region  
Sweden:    21 NUTS 3 regions 
Slovenia:    12 NUTS 3 regions 
Slovakia:    8 NUTS 3 regions 
UK:    133  NUTS  3  regions 
 
Only considered in the calculation of the market potentials: 
Switzerland:   26  cantons 
Norway:   19  fylke 
 
  19A2. Data 
 
Eurostat Regio Data (NUTS 2 and NUTS 3 level) 
•  Gross domestic product (1995 to 2000) 
•  Gross domestic product per capita (1995 to 2000) 
•  Sectoral composition: shares of sectors in total GVA of region - NACE-CLIO R6 classification: 
agriculture, manufacturing, building and construction, market services, non-market services 
(1995-2000) 
Data from the Study programme for European Spatial Planning (SPESP) 
•  Seashore: Length of seashore in percentage of region’s perimeter, 
•  Sunshine: Mean annual sunshine radiation in kWh/m
2, 
•  Emission: Emissions of acidifying gases – 3 classes,  
•  Hazard: Natural hazards – 7 risk classes (earthquakes, volcanic activity, tidal waves, snow 
avalanches, slope instability), 
•  Protected areas: Designated or protected areas – 5 classes, 
•  Cultural sites: Number of registered monuments/cultural sites, 
•  Density of cultural sites: Number of cultural sites by total area. 
•  Tourist pressure: Ratio of yearly tourist stays by total resident population 1997/98 
 
Missing regional data for Denmark and Norway was completed by data from the corresponding 
national statistical offices. 
 
  20Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1:  Regression Results for Market Potential Function 






0 α       6.54** 
(18.55) 
    6.57** 
(19.06) 
1 α       0.17** 
(10.28) 
    0.19** 
(11.05) 
2 α       0.0039** 
(4.61) 
    0.0040** 
(5.02) 
σ   5.81 5.40 
τ   0.00082 0.00090 
Moran’s I 
(z-value) 
    0.24** 
(4.11) 
    0.28** 
(4.62) 
Adj. 
2 R  0.86  0.87 
Notes:  t-statistics are based upon White’s heteroscedasticity-adjusted standard errors.  
The regression models include control variables, dummies for outlying regions,  
and some country-dummies. 
** significant at the 0.01 level, * significant at the 0.05 level. 
  21Table 2:  Estimated Integration Effects on Per Capita Income,  
1995-2000 – All Scenarios 
   Average percentage changes 
   Scenario 
   1  2a 2b 3a 3b 
Bulgaria  0.58 0.21 0.63 0.67 0.94 
Non-border  0.61 0.19 0.56 0.69 1.02 
Internal  border 0.58 0.20 0.59 0.66 0.95 
External  border  0.50 0.28 0.85 0.62 0.77 
Czech  Republic  1.72 2.48 6.86 2.78 1.97 
Non-border  1.65 2.48 6.86 2.72 1.85 
Internal  border 1.74 2.48 6.86 2.80 2.00 
Estonia  1.48 1.91 5.38 2.30 1.81 
Non-border  1.46 2.09 5.85 2.63 1.69 
Internal  border 1.45 1.87 5.29 2.26 1.78 
External  border  1.53 1.73 4.91 2.27 1.97 
Hungary  1.33 1.57 4.48 2.00 1.68 
Non-border  1.12 1.25 3.62 1.66 1.45 
Internal  border 1.46 1.75 4.98 2.22 1.84 
External  border  1.36 1.63 4.65 2.06 1.71 
Lithuania  0.83 0.22 0.66 0.92 1.38 
Non-border  0.85 0.20 0.62 0.93 1.42 
Internal  border 0.83 0.23 0.70 0.93 1.38 
External  border  0.81 0.21 0.63 0.91 1.36 
Latvia  1.34 0.54 1.60 1.57 2.16 
Internal  border 1.22 0.47 1.40 1.42 1.96 
External  border  1.59 0.67 1.98 1.87 2.52 
Poland  0.35 0.43 1.29 0.54 0.45 
Non-border  0.28 0.34 1.01 0.43 0.35 
Internal  border 0.48 0.62 1.84 0.75 0.59 
External  border  0.26 0.26 0.79 0.38 0.35 
Romania  0.32 0.14 0.42 0.38 0.52 
Non-border  0.26 0.10 0.32 0.30 0.42 
Internal  border 0.46 0.20 0.61 0.54 0.73 
External  border  0.36 0.16 0.49 0.44 0.58 
Slovenia  3.32 5.17  13.16  5.47 3.58 
Non-border  3.37 5.39  13.64  5.60 3.56 
Internal  border 3.29 5.13  13.06  5.41 3.54 
External  border  3.33 5.13  13.06  5.45 3.61 
Slovakia  2.35 2.44 6.74 3.37 3.11 
Internal  border 2.41 2.64 7.25 3.51 3.13 
External  border  2.04 1.42 4.07 2.63 3.00 
EU  15  0.01 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.01 
ACC  1.18 1.48 4.25 1.83 1.47 
Source: Own calculations based on data from Eurostat Regio data bank. 


















non-border internal border external border non-border internal border external border
EU 15 EU 15 EU 15 CEEC CEEC CEEC
Overall change due to GVA growth due to reduced border impendiments
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Source: Own Estimates based on Eurostat data. 
 
  23Figure 2:  Changes in Market Potential due to Reduced Border Impediments, 
1995-2000 – Scenario 1 
 
Source: Own Estimates based on Eurostat data. 
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